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Are pension fund managers overconfident?
Abstract
Empirical studies show that people tend to be overconfident about the precision of their knowledge,
leading to miscalibration. Consistent with this, we found that on overage the decision makers of Swiss
pension plans provide too narrow confidence intervals when asked to estimate the past return of various
assets. Their confidence intervals are also systematically too narrow in their forecast of future returns, in
comparison with the historical volatility. They are less miscalibrated, however, than our laymen sample.
Individual differences between the participants' degree of overconfidence are large and stable across
those two different tasks. In a linear regression model we present evi-dence that miscalibration is linked
to individual characteristics. In our sample younger people with an education from university and with
more experience in finance or pension plans are less over-confident than older people without such an
education and with less experience.
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1. Introduction 
On average people tend to be overconfident. In particular, it is well documented that people exhibit 
overconfident behaviour in financial markets. The degree of overconfidence, however, seems to 
vary across individuals and across different domains of questions. In this paper our contribution to 
research is twofold. First, we investigate a special group, the decision-makers of Swiss pension 
plans who not only bear responsibility for their own investments but for the retirement savings of 
thousands of employees in Switzerland.1 So overconfidence might affect not only our participants’ 
private wealth but also the wealth of every employee in a particular pension scheme. Therefore an 
additional level of prudence from our participants could be expected. On the other hand, Odean 
[1998] outlines that possibly exactly those people who are overconfident about their abilities in the 
domain of financial markets are those who are especially attracted by jobs that require financial 
decision-making. We shed some light on this question by showing that decision-makers of Swiss 
pension plans are overconfident but to a lesser degree than a sample of laymen. 
Second, we not only confirm the evidence for individual differences in the degree of overconfi-
dence but also show that those differences are related to individual characteristics. In a linear re-
gression model we measure the impact of individual characteristics - education, experience, and age 
- on overconfidence in the domain of financial markets. We present empirical evidence that younger 
people with a better education and more experience in financial topics are significantly less over-
confident than older participants with less education and less experience. This may help us to gain 
more insight about the impacts of individual background on overconfidence, and to further develop 
more accurate models to capture the underlying mechanisms that drive overconfidence. From a 
practical point of view, this may help us to better assess the qualifications of financial decision-
makers in certain positions and to predict better their investment decisions.  
                                                  
1 A study of the Swiss National Bank SNB [2006] reveals that in 2004 roughly half of all the employee’s wealth in 
Switzerland, around CHF 500 billion, is managed in the second pillar, i.e. in the hands of decision-makers of Swiss 
pension plans.  
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Being overconfident can be harmful on financial markets. In a large sample of private investors 
Odean and Barber [2001] show that overconfidence leads to a higher trading volume and reduces 
portfolio returns. Guiso and Jappelli [2005] use a sample of clients of an Italian bank in which the 
people, - who the authors suppose to be more overconfident (people with a lower education but a 
higher self declared knowledge), - hold portfolios with lower Sharpe ratios than other clients. How-
ever it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the portfolios and the trading activities of Swiss 
pension plans and we do not postulate any causal relationships between the degree of overconfi-
dence of our participants and the investments of the corresponding pension plans.2  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related research on overcon-
fidence in general and in the domain of financial markets. Section III describes the data, and the 
methods to measure overconfidence and introduces our linear regression model to measure the rela-
tionship between overconfidence and individual characteristics. Section IV presents the results for 
miscalibration in our sample and for our linear regression analysis. Section V discusses interpreta-
tions and practical implications of our results and concludes. 
2. Related research on overconfidence 
Overconfidence is a complex phenomenon with various facets. For example, Glaser and Weber 
[2003] differentiate between four different manifestations of overconfidence: miscalibration, better-
than-average-effect, illusion of control and overoptimism. We concentrate only on miscalibration in 
the context of estimating past performance and forecasting future returns of financial assets, be-
cause it reflects how people perceive the underlying risk of financial products, which is crucial to 
investment decisions. 
People tend to overestimate the precision of their knowledge. As a result, they are miscalibrated in 
estimating and forecasting by providing too narrow confidence intervals (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff 
and Philips [1982]). It has been observed that task difficulty and blurred feedback lead to more 
                                                  
2 For an approach about how overconfidence is related to investment strategies of fund managers see Menkhoff and 
Schmidt [2005]  
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overconfidence (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Philips [1982], Griffin and Tversky [1992]). Odean 
[1998] argues that forecasting and estimating returns on financial markets are not easy tasks and the 
available feedback is blurred as the market prices of assets are affected by noise. So the chances to 
observe overconfident behaviour in the domain of financial markets are relatively high.  
Current psychological research debates whether miscalibration is a stable human trait or only a sta-
tistical illusion (see Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting [1991], Griffin and Tversky [1992], 
Erev, Wallsten and Budescu [1994], Brenner, Liberman and Tversky [1996] and Klayman, Soll, 
Gonzales-Vallejo and Barlas [1999]). As Soll and Klayman [2004] point out the type of question 
matters and tasks which involve estimations of confidence intervals typically lead to higher meas-
ures for miscalibration. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze miscalibration in general and 
with respect to different types of measurement. We focus on the task of estimation and forecasting 
of asset returns, which are similar to tasks the decision makers of Swiss pension plans frequently 
face in their jobs and which might impact the wealth of Swiss pension plans. 
Studies show that financial professionals are subject to miscalibration. Russo and Schoemaker 
[1992] report that money managers tend to formulate too narrow 90% confidence intervals in a 
questionnaire about meta-knowledge. The participants’ subjective confidence intervals in their sam-
ple contain the correct solutions only in roughly half of the cases instead of 90% as required. 
Deaves, Lueders and Schroeder [2005] and Glaser, Weber and Langer [2003] present similar evi-
dence in the domain of financial markets as the confidence intervals of the participants in their sam-
ples of professionals capture significantly less realized returns for economic forecasts than required. 
They also notice that the individual degree of overconfidence is stable across different tasks. This 
result indicates that people are in general overconfident in the domain of financial markets and not 
just within particular asset classes or particular tasks. Graham and Campbell [2003] analyze eco-
nomic forecasts on the equity risk premium from CFOs in the USA over different time horizons and 
conclude that the size of the average confidence interval is very narrow compared to the volatility of 
equity markets. This is no direct observation for miscalibration because they undertake no ex post 
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comparison between a subject’s confidence interval and the accuracy of his answers. Nevertheless 
we interpret this information as an indirect indication of miscalibration because the participants 
express a surprisingly high confidence about their abilities to forecast returns on financial markets.  
There is no doubt that individual characteristics affect overconfidence but the evidence about the 
relationship between those individual characteristics of a person and its degree of overconfidence is 
ambiguous. Russo and Schoemaker [1992] report evidence that professionals in their sample are in 
general miscalibrated but to a lesser degree than laymen. In contrast Glaser, Weber and Langer 
[2003] find that professionals are more overconfident than a sample of students about their trend 
recognition abilities although they do not provide more accurate estimations. Graham, Campbell 
and Huang [2006] and Glaser, Weber and Langer [2005] present evidence that the degree of over-
confidence in the domain of financial markets is different among individuals. In a model from 
Odean and Gervais [2001] more experience is related to a smaller degree of overconfidence. Inex-
perienced but successful investors are most prone to overconfidence as they self-attribute their suc-
cess solely to their abilities. Over time more experience will help them to better evaluate their true 
abilities. Locke and Mann [2001] confirm this theory empirically as they find no indication of mis-
calibration among highly experienced traders on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). Heath 
and Tversky [1991] show that people prefer to bet on their own judgment if they feel comfortable in 
a domain than on chance-matched lottery and vice-versa. In light of those results the question is if 
individual characteristics such as education or experience increase overconfidence in the domain of 
financial markets. 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Respondents and questionnaire 
In total 584 questionnaires have been distributed among decision-makers of Swiss pension plans - 
we refer to this sample as the professional sample - and 132 have been returned. This corresponds 
to a response rate of 22.6%. Twenty-four questionnaires contained no confidence intervals and 
therefore have been excluded from the analysis so the professional sample consists of 108 partici-
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pants (Only 6 participants are female). 58 persons have a university degree, 36 of them in finance. 
65 attended education courses in finance for practitioners. Experience in finance and in pension 
plans is symmetrically distributed between less than 2 years and more than 25 years, and the re-
spondents are between 25 and 80 years old.  
A laymen sample is based on people working for the City of Zurich in several departments not re-
lated to financial markets or pension plans but with a self-declared interest in financial topics. In 
total 104 persons, 19 woman and 85 men, returned a complete questionnaire. 25 of them have a 
degree from university but only 16 in finance or economics and 32 have attended courses in finance 
for practitioners. Two-thirds have no experience in working in financial areas but two-thirds do 
frequently read newspapers related to financial topics. The participants in the laymen sample are 
between 20 and 65 years old. 
The questionnaire for the participants in both the professional and laymen sample consists of two 
parts.3 In the first part the respondents provided data about individual characteristics. In the second 
part the participants were asked to formulate two sorts of 90% confidence intervals. First, 90% con-
fidence intervals for historical annual returns for 6 different asset classes over the last 36 years. 
Second, 90% confidence intervals for return forecasts for 6 different asset classes for the year 2006. 
This allows us to estimate the participant’s degree of miscalibration in two distinct aspects of finan-
cial markets and to analyze whether there are any differences between those two tasks. In the analy-
sis of confidence intervals for return forecasts we include all participants whereas in the analysis of 
confidence intervals for historical returns we only include those from participants who provided 
negative lower boundaries in the confidence intervals for the asset class world equities. The reason 
is to not bias the study with respondents who might have misunderstood the question (i.e. provided 
a 90% confidence interval for the annualized mean return over the whole 36 years instead of a 90% 
confidence interval for all annual returns in that period). In total 56 participants from the profes-
                                                  
3 The questionnaire contained also other parts but those are not relevant for this paper. 
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sional sample are included. If we included the confidence intervals from all the participants, mis-
calibration would appear to be much higher but arguably may be spurious.  
The period for handing in the questionnaire was from May 2006 until August 2006. As the returns 
of the different asset classes were volatile over that time period it might be the case that the 90% 
confidence intervals were affected. A t-test reveals however that there are no differences between 
the means for 90% confidence intervals from people who handed in their questionnaires before or 
after mid of June 2006. In the laymen sample the questionnaires were all handed in within the end 
of May and the end of June 2006. 
3.2 Methods 
In this paper we use two different methods to judge the participant’s confidence intervals. First, 
following an idea of Hilton [2001],we compare the participants’ subjective confidence intervals for 
annual returns with the distribution of historical annual returns over the last 36 years. The focus on 
confidence interval sizes allows us to analyze the risks the participants perceive in different asset 
classes since overconfidence may lead to a wrong perception of risks on financial markets. 
More concretely we count the number of annual returns over the last 36 years that are included 
within the participants’ 90% confidence intervals. For each asset class we collected the last 36 real-
ized historical annual returns and we simply cut off the 2 highest and lowest returns to approximate 
a 90% (precisely 88.9%) interval of the annual returns in each asset class. In other words 90% of the 
annual returns over the last 36 years are included in those intervals and this corresponds to 32 an-
nual returns. A miscalibrated participant may provide too narrow 90% confidence intervals and thus 
captures less than 32 annual returns of the last 36 annual returns.  
Second, we analyze the implied volatility of the participants’ confidence intervals where we make 
use of a relationship that Pearson and Tukey [1965] describe. With the term implied volatility we 
refer to a relationship between the 95% and 5% return quantile (which corresponds to a 90% inter-
val) and the standard deviation as is given in equation (1).  
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Standard deviation = (95% return quantile – 5% return quantile) / 3.25  (1) 
Like in the first approach we then compare the participants’ answers with historical data, i.e. the 
participants’ implied volatilities in their confidence intervals with the historical annual volatility of 
each asset class based on the annual returns over the last 36 years. Volatility is a popular way to 
express uncertainty about future returns of an asset class and the higher the volatility the broader is 
the spectrum in which the realization of the future return will fall with a certain probability. If a 
participant formulates confidence intervals with very low implied volatilities we interpret this as an 
indication that he is overconfident. The historical volatility of annual returns over the last 36 years 
therefore serves as a guideline to judge the size of the implied volatilities.   
We acknowledge one caveat in the approaches in this paper as an estimation error due to the com-
parison of confidence intervals with historical annual returns could arise. By definition we only 
have 36 observations for annual returns over the last 36 years and in total we cut off 4 annual re-
turns in each asset class to approach a 90% interval. So the measurement of miscalibration with a 
comparison between the size of historical return intervals and subjective confidence intervals de-
pends on the highest and lowest historical annual returns. The difference between the highest and 
the lowest annual return that are included in our 90% interval and those 4 annual returns that are 
excluded could matter. However we notice that our results are not materially influenced by changes 
of the historical return intervals that we use to construct historical intervals and that the volatilities 
of annual returns in different asset classes are realistic.4
To analyze the relationships between overconfidence and individual characteristics we use a linear 
regression model with 6 predictors. We differentiate between 4 mutually exclusive sorts of educa-
tion: non-finance education from university, finance education from university, education in finance 
from courses for practitioners, and no such education, resulting in 3 dummy variables. In case a 
person has both a degree from university and an additional education in finance for practitioners we 
                                                  
4 The reason is that the differences between subjective confidence intervals and historical annual returns are much larger 
than the differences between included and excluded historical annual returns. The largest difference between an in-
cluded and an excluded return occurs in the USD-CHF exchange rate with 8.9% and the average difference is 3.9%. 
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only considered the university degree to mitigate double counting. We further use two types of ex-
perience – experience in finance and experience in pension plans – and age as predictors which can 
take values from 1 to 7 reflecting more or less experience and a lower or higher age respectively.5 
Some of those 6 predictors are positively correlated but never above a level of 0.6. The only excep-
tion is the highly negative correlation between the 2 different variables for financial education. As 
those variables are both dummies we expect them not to distort the regression model. Gender is not 
included in the regression model as the number of females in the professional sample is too low. 
To analyze confidence intervals across all participants we present median values as there are a few 
outliers that have big impacts on the mean. In the application of the linear regressions analysis we 
use the logarithm of the confidence intervals and the corresponding boundaries to mitigate such 
outlier effects. However the results do not substantially change if we analyze the non-transformed 
data. We report R2 to provide information about the amount of variance our regressions explain. No 
significant interaction effects have been identified within the variables for our regression model so 
we do not include interaction variables. Cooks D values indicate no significant effects of outliers.   
4. Results 
4.1 Estimation of historical returns 
The first row in Table 1 shows that, except for CHF bonds and gold, the median lower boundaries 
of 90% intervals estimated by the professional sample are above the historical lower boundaries 
(seventh row). On the other hand the median estimated upper boundaries are below the historical 
upper boundaries for all asset classes except for the USD-CHF exchange rate. In other words, on 
average the professional sample underestimates both the downside risk and the upside potential. 
Not surprisingly the medians for 90% confidence intervals from the professional sample (second 
row of Table 1) are narrower than the historical 90% intervals for annual returns over the last 36 
                                                  
5 Both predictors for experience can take 7 different values which range from 1 (no experience) to 7 (more than 25 years 
experience). Age can also take values from 1 (below 25 years) to 7 (above 65 years). 
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years in all asset classes. The laymen sample provides even narrower boundaries and intervals for 
all asset classes which is a sign of a higher degree of miscalibration. (Insert Table 1 here) 
The median subjective 90% confidence intervals only capture around 60%~80% of the past annual 
returns in the professional sample and around 50%~70% in the laymen sample (oil is the exception) 
as can be seen in the tenth and eleventh row of Table 1. This is evidence that both samples are mis-
calibrated on average because the participants’ confidence intervals were meant to contain 90% of 
the annual returns over the last 36 years. We also note that the professional sample provides on av-
erage broader confidence intervals than the laymen except for world equities, which implies that 
professionals were less miscalibrated than the laymen sample.  
Another indication for miscalibration is given by a comparison of the implied volatilities embedded 
in the confidence intervals (row 3 and 6 of Table 1) and the volatility of historical annual returns 
(row 9). We see that the implied volatilities in both samples are significantly lower than the histori-
cal volatilities in all asset classes except for gold and the USD-CHF exchange rate in the profes-
sional sample. Further evidence for miscalibration is given in rows twelve and thirteen in Table 1 as 
a majority of all participants in both samples provide 90% confidence intervals which are narrower 
than the historical intervals on each asset class.  
An interesting result is the fact that the participants in the professional as well as in the laymen 
sample have a good feeling for the relative risk of each asset class. The ratios between the historical 
intervals and the subjective confidence intervals are close to 0.7 and 0.6 respectively in all asset 
classes (bottom two rows in Table 1). Those ratios are calculated by dividing the historical intervals 
by the median of the subjective confidence intervals. This leads to the conclusion that the profes-
sional and the laymen sample are both well informed about the relative risk of each asset class. 
The professionals provide larger intervals than the laymen on average so they are less miscalibrated. 
A Mann-Whitney test however reveals that the differences between the confidence interval sizes are 
not significant except for gold and the USD-CHF exchange rate (second and fourth row in Table 1). 
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Further we note that the confidence intervals in the professional sample contain more annual returns 
over the last 36 years, fewer participants provide narrow intervals compared to historical intervals 
and the confidence-interval to historical-interval ratios are higher in most of the asset classes but 
never on a significant level according to Mann-Whitney tests.  
4.2 Return forecasts 
We now focus on the participants 90% confidence intervals for return forecasts in different asset 
classes for the year 2006. As we know from almost every brochure of an asset manager past per-
formance is no indicator for future performance. Therefore we take into account that a good knowl-
edge of the past is not necessarily related to good return forecasts but it seems plausible that good 
knowledge of the the distribution of historical annual returns in different asset classes is related to a 
higher level of awareness for potential risks in the future.  
Table 2 lists in the first 6 rows the median boundaries, the 90% confidence intervals and the implied 
volatilities for the return forecasts for 6 different asset classes in the year 2006 for the professional 
and the laymen sample. Like in section 4.1 we count the number of annual returns that fall into the 
participant’s confidence intervals for forecasts to analyze the degree of miscalibration in our sam-
ples and we compare the implied volatilities with historical volatilities. Rows 8 and 9 show that 
only around 20% of the annual returns of Swiss equities and CHF bonds would be included in the 
confidence intervals of the professionals and the numbers for the laymen are even lower. This is 
evidence that both of our samples are significantly miscalibrated in the domain of forecasting re-
turns on financial markets. The medians for the implied volatilities are much lower than the histori-
cal volatilities for Swiss equities and CHF bonds over the last 36 years (rows 3 and 6).  
We acknowledge that the participants provided their answers between May 2006 and August 2006 
and it might be the case that they already used the available information for the year 2006 and a 
comparison with semiannual volatility might be fairer. But even in comparison with semiannual 
volatilities (16.72% for Swiss equities and 3.78% for CHF bonds) the implied volatilities in Table 2 
look very low. We interpret this as a clear indication that the participants in both of our samples are 
 12
miscalibrated in the domain of forecasting returns on financial markets. The participants’ confi-
dence intervals for the four types of pension plan returns are also all very narrow but those asset 
classes are difficult to compare to reasonable benchmarks. However we have the strong impression 
that the confidence intervals for those forecasts are also very narrow compared to the distribution of 
historical returns and also indicate overconfidence in our sample. (Insert Table 2 here) 
Similar to the estimation task in the previous section, the degree of miscalibration is also bigger 
among laymen because they provide narrower confidence intervals than the professionals and the 
differences are significant in all asset classes (Table 2). Mann-Whitney tests confirm that the lay-
men provide significantly higher values for the lower boundaries of their confidence intervals in all 
asset classes. A comparison between the upper boundaries of the two samples however shows that 
the laymen are more optimistic but the difference is only significant for 3 asset classes (CHF bonds, 
pension plan CHF bonds and average pension plans). So the professionals express a more conserva-
tive view with respect to downside risk but expect a comparable upside potential in each asset class. 
It is worth to note that the participants in the professional as well as the laymen sample express very 
stable answering patterns within both types of tasks. The average correlation in the professional 
sample (laymen sample) for forecast intervals is 0.80 (0.64) and ranges from 0.72 to 0.92 (0.47 to 
0.89). For the historical intervals the average is 0.60 (0.56) and lies between 0.33 and 0.92 (0.44 
and 0.77). Even the correlations between forecasts intervals and historical intervals are always posi-
tively correlated with an average of 0.32 (0.18). Those findings are evidence that the sizes of a par-
ticipant’s confidence intervals across all tasks in the questionnaire are very stable. Providing narrow 
confidence intervals seems to be a stable trait across individuals regardless of the asset class and the 
type of estimation (forecast or historical).  
We can summarize our results by saying that the decision-makers of Swiss pension plans are mis-
calibrated when forecasting future returns as well as when estimating historical returns on financial 
markets but to a lesser degree than a sample of laymen and with more conservative expectations. 
We also note that both samples have a good sense for the relative risk of different asset classes but 
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are roughly equally miscalibrated across all asset classes with a high stability across individuals. 
The next section addresses the relationships between individual characteristics and overconfidence 
and suggests an explanation for those findings. 
4.3 Linear regressions 
In this section we show that individual characteristics of our participants can explain the individual 
stability in our participant’s answering patterns. Table 3 contains all results of our regression mod-
els segregated into four different panels (A, B, C, and D). (Insert Table 3 here) 
Panel A and B contain the results of linear regression analysis of the individual characteristics on 
the participants’ confidence intervals for historical returns of different asset classes for both samples 
respectively. Our regression model works pretty well for the professional sample with an average 
R2 of 28.8% over all asset classes (second row from the bottom in Table 3) but cannot relate our 
predictors to the 90% confidence intervals for historical returns in the laymen sample equally well 
as the average R2 is not above 10% except for gold and oil. 
The dummy variable general education from university is significantly related to broader confi-
dence intervals in all asset classes. The other predictors related to education are not significant for 
most of the asset classes but also show always positive values. On the other hand older age is al-
ways related to narrower confidence intervals. This indicates that older people with less education 
are more miscalibrated than younger people with more education. In line with the model from 
Odean and Gervais [2001] the two variables for experience tend to reduce overconfidence as people 
with more financial or pension plan experience provide broader confidence intervals for historical 
returns, but the effects are not significant for most of the asset classes. 
In panels C and D we analyze the 90% confidence intervals for return forecasts in both samples. 
The regression model shows a comparable explanatory power in both the professional and the lay-
men sample as the average R2 are 15.9% and 16.8% respectively. The panels present evidence that 
general education from university has again a significant positive influence on the sizes of the fore-
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cast intervals in the professional as well as the laymen sample. Like in the model for historical con-
fidence intervals, the other predictors for education are positive most of the times but rarely at sig-
nificant level. In line with previous evidence older people provide significantly narrower forecast 
intervals than younger people, but the effect is stronger in the laymen sample than in the profes-
sional sample. More experience either in pension plans or in finance is also related to broader fore-
cast intervals as most of the standardized Beta coefficients in panels C and D are positive and the 
influence is significant in 4 (3) cases in the professional (laymen) sample. 
Those findings are evidence for the fact that individual characteristics like education, experience 
and age influence a persons’ degree of miscalibration in the domain of financial markets. We dis-
cuss the aspects of our results in the next section. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
We confirm that people are overconfident in the domain of financial markets but provide new evi-
dence that this is also the case in a sample of decision-makers of Swiss pension plans. They are 
miscalibrated because they provide very narrow confidence intervals for estimating historical and 
future returns of different asset classes. This finding seems interesting to us because decision-
makers of pension plans are not only responsible for their own wealth management but also for the 
retirement payments of most of the employees in Switzerland. We expect such a sample to consist 
of rather prudent investors because of the high responsibility level they bear but still we find evi-
dence for overconfidence. We asked all participants to express their personal views in our question-
naire and not the corporate views of their pension plans. So we can not relate the answers of the 
decision-makers in our professional sample to the investments of any particular pension plan. Also 
there is no direct link between a participant’s degree of overconfidence and his investment behav-
iour in our sample. However we want to emphasize two practical issues related to our findings. The 
first addresses the strategic asset allocation and the second deals with its implementation.  
There is evidence that decision-makers of Swiss pension plans on average underestimate the his-
torical volatility and the historical downside risk of different asset classes. Moreover, they express 
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very low implied volatilities with their confidence intervals for return forecasts. Such an overconfi-
dently biased perception of low risks in a volatile asset class like for example equities could in-
crease the perceived Sharpe ratio of that asset class and makes it look more attractive. This might 
then result in an overweight of that asset class in a pension plan’s asset allocation, might lead to an 
increased overall volatility of the portfolio and exposes it more to downside risks but the overconfi-
dent decision-makers might be unaware of that risk. De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman 
[1990] present a theoretical model to demonstrate that noise traders with erroneous stochastic be-
liefs (like for example miscalibrated investors) can not only survive in the market but can also earn 
higher expected returns. However such noise traders take excessive risk and gain less expected util-
ity than rational investors. Having said that we point out that the participants in our sample provide 
too narrow confidence intervals for all asset classes and not only for more volatile ones so we can-
not generalize the argument that high risk assets are overweighted. Further research is needed to 
address the relationship between miscalibration and the weighting of risky asset in a strategic asset 
allocation. Nevertheless excessive portfolio risk due to miscalibration is an issue for every inves-
tor’s portfolio and not only for pension plans, but in the latter case the effects are particularly seri-
ous. Higher portfolio volatility and more exposure to downside risk put a pension plan’s coverage 
ratio at a higher risk and might reduce the pension plans’ ability to guarantee future retirement 
payments in general. It is not a healthy signal to the market – neither the labour market nor the fi-
nancial market - if a company reports a severe reduction in the coverage ratio of its pension plans 
and has to increase its contributions. Therefore we recommend pension plans to take a cautious 
view on assumptions about risk-return-profiles of different asset classes. Further we encourage de-
cision-makers of pension plans to conduct sensitivity analysis with very bad scenarios when defin-
ing the strategic asset allocation to develop a better intuitive feeling and a higher degree of aware-
ness for potential downside risks in a portfolio.  
The second issue addresses an issue for overconfident decision-makers in the implementation of the 
strategic asset allocation. It is related to present findings of other authors who demonstrate that 
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overconfidence can have an impact on trading decisions of investors. In most of those studies over-
confidence is a drag on performance either because of higher transaction costs due to an increased 
trading volume (Odean [1999]) or because investors misperceive the true probabilities of market 
situations and over- or underreact (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam [1998]). Decision-
makers might overconfidently perceive opportunities to exploit market inefficiencies because cur-
rent market prices deviate from their subjective (and as presented very narrow) forecast intervals 
and might lead them to increase tactical trading. Tactical trading always generates additional trans-
action costs that have to be compensated by higher returns. Academic research presents few indica-
tions that tactical trading, often referred to as timing, pays off in general (see for example Daniel, 
Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers [1997] who analyze a sample of mutual funds and find no success 
with timing in most of the funds or Blake, Lehman and Timmermann [1999] who report that UK 
pension plans have on average no timing skills). If this was also true for Swiss pension plans there 
might be some room to increase returns by reducing trading costs caused by tactical trading due to 
overconfident forecasting. However further research is needed to analyze in depth the relationship 
between pension plan investments and the degree of overconfidence of the decision-makers. 
There is an explanation for an individuals’ proneness to overconfidence that seems relevant in our 
context as it puts the aforementioned two practical issues in perspective. It is based on a trade-off 
described in Yaniv and Foster [1995]. When providing confidence intervals participants face a 
trade-off between accuracy and informativeness because narrower confidence intervals are ususally 
more informative but less accurate. The formulation of narrow confidence intervals might be on 
purpose as participants eventually put a lot of weight on informativeness and little weight on accu-
racy. When guessing how many championships Michael Jordan has won in his stellar career an in-
terval of 4-5 times is more helpful than an interval 0-15 times. However only the second interval 
contains the correct number of 6 championships. Narrower forecast intervals provide more informa-
tion than large forecast intervals and Cesarini, Sandewall and Johannesson [2003] argue that espe-
cially professionals are keen on demonstrating their knowledge with informative (and therefore nar-
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row) confidence intervals. We can not exclude the possibility that the participants in our samples 
want to express informative views knowing that those might not be accurate in 90% of the cases but 
simply put more weight on informative confidence intervals instead of accurate intervals.  
In light of this argument we acknowledge that an analysis of only the size of the participants’ confi-
dence intervals does not provide any information about the accuracy, i.e. how much the lower and 
upper boundaries of a subjective confidence interval deviate from the historical interval boundaries. 
We measure those deviations as the log-transformed sum of the absolute differences between the 
participants’ boundaries and the historical boundaries for each asset class. The closer a participant’s 
lower and upper boundaries to the historical interval boundaries the lower are his deviations and the 
more accurate are his confidence intervals in an asset class. We have no benchmark to compare the 
absolute deviations of the participants’ intervals so we cannot comment on the absolute results but 
we can compare our professional sample with the laymen sample. Mann-Whitney tests show that 
the professional sample provides more accurate boundaries for every asset class. The difference is 
significant on the 5% level for Swiss equities, gold, oil, the USD-CHF exchange rate and also the 
average over all asset classes. Knowing the past performance of some asset classes is no guarantee 
of predicting future returns correctly or defining more appropriate asset allocations for pension 
plans but at least the participants in the professional sample are better informed about the distribu-
tion of historical annual returns than a sample of laymen which might help to be more aware of fu-
ture risks. This is good news for the second pillar in Switzerland because the three aforementioned 
issues are probably better addressed by our professional sample than by our laymen sample.  
We also want to emphasize that average levels of miscalibration in our sample are bad predictors 
for an individual’s degree of miscalibration. With this paper we take the miscalibration research one 
step further as we demonstrate that people tend not to be homogenously miscalibrated but that indi-
vidual differences are significant and stable across the tasks in our questionnaire. Observable per-
sonal characteristics like education, experience and age seem to influence a person’s degree of mis-
calibration. Our findings suggest that a better education may reduce overconfidence and that older 
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people with less experience in finance or pension plans tend to be more overconfident than young 
people with more experience. Age, however, seems not to be a good proxy for experience in the 
domain of financial markets. From a theoretical point of view, it is a curious question to ask why 
and how these demographic variables affect miscalibration. Potentially age, education, and experi-
ence may be related to financial literacy, the ability to learn from feedback, and other factors. Fu-
ture research may distinguish these alternative interpretations. Our findings also have certain impli-
cations in practice, for example, regarding the screening of fund managers, the voting for the board 
of trustees of pension plans, and the designing of professional training programs.  
The significant influence of age in our linear regression model might also be related to the regula-
tion in Switzerland, which our samples are subjected to. Swiss regulation implies an asymmetric 
sharing of pension plan portfolio risk between current employees and pensioners. In case a pension 
plan is underfunded, the employees’ future retirement payments can be reduced and their current 
contributions to the pension plan can be increased whereas the payments to current pensioners are 
guaranteed and fixed. Therefore older people in Switzerland might care less about downside risks in 
financial markets because they will only participate on the upside (receive higher pensions) but not 
on the downside with their pension plans. However this argument is not applicable in the profes-
sional sample as the older decision-makers of Swiss pension plans not only bear the responsibility 
for themselves but for the overall pension plan. In addition we asked the participants for their per-
sonal views and underestimating downside risk would put older people’s private investments at 
risk, too.   
The unexplained variance in our model indicates that other factors are necessary to explain individ-
ual differences in miscalibration in the domain of financial markets, which deservers further explo-
ration in the next step. It would also be interesting to investigate other facets of overconfidence like 
illusion of control or overoptimism, and the interaction of these phenomena with individual charac-
teristics. 
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